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Abstract
This paper examines whether the growing use of non-permanent
contracts may have influenced the intra-family income differences in
Italy over time. After the 1996, a number of reforms were imple-
mented to reduce the levels of employment protection. Thus we aim
at providing evidence on the determinants of potential changes to per-
sonal level of income before and after the introduction of such rules.
In particular, we calculate the contribution of each individual within
the family using two Italian longitudinal data (namely ECHP and IT-
Silc). We perform estimations for men and women, separately. Our
results confirm that the amount of contribution changes over the span
considered. Fathers are generally more likely to support other family
members. Sons are instead money receivers, and the magnitude of the
coefficient is especially large when labour market flexibility has been
already introduced. Individuals with part time temporary contracts
face less favourable financial conditions. Finally, those who are out
of the labour market (i.e. retired, unemployed, inactive) contribute
negatively within the family.
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21 Introduction
This paper examines whether the labour market flexibility through the grow-
ing use of non-permanent contracts may have influenced the intra-family in-
come differences in Italy over time: to the extent that these arrangements,
increasing labour market opportunities, contribute to enlarging the relative
input into family income. A working household member makes a larger eco-
nomic contribution than a non-working member, even if he has a low income
(Brown and Session, 2005; Booth et al., 2002; Cutulli, 2008; Picchio, 2008;
Comi and Grasseni, 2009). So the most interesting question, in this context,
is if institutional changes can alleviate intra-family economic inequalities or
not.
Over the last fifteen years the Italian labour market has been influenced
by several institutional changes. After the 1990s occupational crisis, a num-
ber of reforms were implemented to reduce the level of employment protec-
tion in favour of permanent workers. These strict regulations were consid-
ered as the major cause of high unemployment rates along with negligible
replacement rates in the labour market. In particular, the first consider-
able intervention, in the aforementioned direction, occurred in 1997 through
the so-called Pacchetto Treu (L.196/1997). The introduction of such rules
widened the opportunities of hiring new staff, i.e. adopting more flexible
contractual conditions. More precisely, since then firms have been eligible
to make use of fixed term contracts every time technical, organizational and
productive motivations, need to adjusting their workforces. This flexibility
path was then carried on with the Biagi Law (L. 30/2003) which essentially
introduced additional types of temporary contracts. It is worth underlining
that the primary effect of such interventions has increased the employment
rates over the last decade, in spite of a moderate economic growth.
The proliferation of the so-called atypical or non-standard forms of em-
ployment calls into question the greater discrimination of such category of
workers. In general, temporary workers experience several disadvantages,
such as higher probability of unemployment and risk of on the job injuries,
lower welfare provision, lower earnings, lower lifelong training, and lower fer-
tility rate other than limited access to the financial market (OECD, 2004;
Guadalupe, 2003). Nevertheless fixed term employees may have worse work-
ing conditions than those in similar permanent jobs and they experience fre-
quent periods of unemployment and consequent sharp income fluctuations
that endanger their economic self-sufficiency. (Diaz and Sanchez, 2008; Gash
and McGinnity, 2007; Petrongolo, 2004).
Overall the reforms have mainly encouraged the labour force participa-
tion of women and youths: Italy is indeed one of the developed countries
that has the lowest level of female employment and the greatest gap between
male and female employment rates. According to the Eurostat statistics, in
32007 female employment rate1 reached 47.2% in 2008 in Italy versus 60%
in European Union.2 This picture illustrates how difficult it is for women
to enter the labour market. Thus such labour market ‘flexibilization’ helps
people to improve their employability, in order to successfully integrate -
or be reintegrated - into the active part of the labour market. Especially
unemployed people and those who have not yet been economically active
but are willing to work or mothers who wish to return to work after a tem-
porary interruption are the primary target of such deregulations (Barbieri
and Scherer, 2009).
Most of the previous empirical studies focus on how the introduction of
more flexible types of contracts lead to a segmentation of the labour mar-
ket. This situation is a matter of some concern as, on the one hand, there
are permanent workers with more favourable occupational conditions as well
as benefits (higher wages, access to training courses, job protection, govern-
ment subsidies in case of job loss and a better welfare provision once retired).
On the other hand, temporary workers are, instead, discriminated both in
terms of monetary and non-monetary aspects. This category shows lower
wages in sharp contrast with the economic theory, which suggests that fixed
term workers should contract higher hourly wage to compensate the risk
of becoming unemployed (Rosen, 1986). With regards to Italy, both Pic-
chio (2008) and Cutulli (2008) find wage differentials between permanent
and non-permanent employees varying from 7% to 20%, using Italian data
drawn from the Bank of Italy. This result is also confirmed by Lucidi and
Raitano (2009) who provide evidence of a wage penalty associated to tempo-
rary contract owners of about 10%. In addition, non-permanent workers are
also penalised regarding the opportunities for career advancement and about
receiving work-related training (Arulampalam and Booth, 1997). They face
low levels of retention and job satisfaction, too. Many studies concerning
fixed term contracts analyse whether they are useful stepping-stones to per-
manent jobs or not (Booth et al., 2002; Corsini and Guerrazzi, 2007; Berton
et al., 2008).
The issues related to the boom in temporary contracts have been widely
analysed over recent years, but remarkably little is known about their im-
pact on household income differences. Clearly, the interest in this subject
derives from a concern of poverty, and inequality, and recognition that dif-
ferential resource allocations within households may seriously reduce the
welfare of some members. Our attempt is hence to provide evidence on the
determinants which may facilitate a better understanding of the potential
changes to personal levels of income regarding other family members before
and after the reduction of employment protection rules.
1Eurostat calculates the female employment rate by dividing the number of women
aged 15-64 in employment by the total female population of the same age group
2Statistics available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home
4For each individual, living in a specific family, we refer to the general
household utility framework, which goes back to Becker (1974, 1981) and
Samuelson (1956), to assess the difference between his/her personal income
from the relative household income. This unitary approach is based on the
assumption that preferences are identically distributed within the family and
household utility is maximised subject to a single budget constraint. As a
result, income redistribution within the household does not change family
behaviour.
The hypothesis of equal sharing resources between all household mem-
bers is definitely a more practical strategy to reaching our final aim that
is to detect if lowering labour market protection reduces income inequality
between family members. In particular, the contribution of each individual
to other family members, as the ratio between (1) the difference of his/her
personal income and the per-capita income and (2) the equivalent household
income, is calculated. Two longitudinal data drawn from the Italian surveys
- ECHP and IT-Silc - conducted respectively over the period 1995-1996 and
2004-2005 are used. Panel data technique is performed and also the analysis
is carried out for men and women, separately.
Our results confirm that the contribution changes over the span consid-
ered. Men are generally more likely to support other family members. Sons
appear to be money receivers with regard to other family members, and the
magnitude of the coefficient is especially large when labour market flexibility
has been already implemented. Finally, with regard to the contract-related
variables, the category of workers, in a less favourable financial conditions,
is part time temporary contract holders compared to those who have other
atypical contract forms. Individuals who are out of the labour market for
several reasons, i.e. retirement, unemployment and inactivity, contribute
negatively within the family.
In the following section, the data source are described and the raw data
are examined to see the extent of temporary job holding in Italy, while the
empirical strategy is available in section III. The estimates are presented in
the fourth section. The final section summarises and draws conclusions.
2 Data
The empirical investigation focuses on Italy. Two surveys are taken into
account in order to describe whether the pervasive use of non-permanent
contracts may have affected intra-family income differences in Italy. In par-
ticular, for the period before the so-called Pacchetto Treu (L.196/1997) the
Italian questionnaire of the European Community Household Panel is used
(ECHP). While the Italian questionnaire of Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (IT-Silc) is adopted for analysing the impact of labour mar-
ket reforms in terms of employment flexibility during the period 1997-2003
5Table 1: Sample size by gender over the two periods
ECHP IT-Silc
1995 1996 2004 2005
Men 8099 7607 10543 14965
Women 9243 8687 12197 17368
Total 17342 16294 22740 32333
(namely the Pacchetto Treu, the Decree Law (2001) and the Biagi Law (L.
30/2003)). These data are based on a standardized questionnaire filled by
individuals and households in several European countries and on several is-
sues. The former is composed of 8 waves (1994-2001) while the latter by 4
waves (2004-2007). However, after some elaborations (mainly on income)
the following waves have been considered: 1995-1996 for ECHP and 2004-
2005 for IT-Silc. In this way a ten years span is covered in order to describe
the determinants of potential changes occurred to personal levels of income
before and after the reduction of employment protection rules.
Both ECHP and IT-Silc collect information on monetary transfer be-
tween families based on the assumption that these are between heads of
household, but these two surveys do not provide any details about money
contribution to and from individuals within the households3.
We look at other datasets available for Italy and we conclude that: 1)
Bank of Italy data (SHIW - Survey on Household Income and Wealth) are
not useful for our purpose; although this dataset provide information on
income transfers between individuals, such information exclusively refers to
members of different households instead of members of the same family.
Furthermore, building a panel over the period considered reduce dramati-
cally the number of observations as only 25% of households contained in the
previous wave are re-interviewed. Finally, the most important motivation is
that the disaggregation of the employment contract by different categories
is not available in 1995; 2) Share (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe) collects monetary transfers between individual within a family,
but includes only individuals aged 50 and over and interviewed only twice,
namely 2004 and 2006.
As mentioned above, although the datasets we used do not collect di-
rectly information on money transfers within the family, they are a rich
source of data regarding both the individual and household characteristics.
Moreover the period covered by information is suitable for our empirical
exercise as it refers both to the time before and after the implementation of
the new regulations.
3ECHP collects individual money transfers received i.e. financial support from rela-
tives, friends or other persons outside the household, while IT-Silc collects inter-household
cash transfer received and paid
6Monetary contributions within the family depend on different choices
each family member makes: investment in education, labour market par-
ticipation and consequently earnings profile. Moreover such contributions
are associated with the role each member has in the family, his bargaining
power and his mutual exchanges. For these reasons two different samples
are exploited and separated regressions by gender are run. Table 1 shows
the number of observations in each group for the two periods.
We, then, define money contribution within the family according to the
following strategy: first, we assume that consumption of each members of
the family is equal to the per-capita income. Secondly, following an OECD
procedure (OECD, 2001) the contribution of each member within a family is
defined as: (1) the personal income from labour and pension minus (2) per-
capita income from labour and pension4 divided by (3) the total equivalized
net household income5. The share of individual contribution, which can be
negative when a person is a receiver or positive when a member is a giver, is
provided. Table 2 shows the distribution of income by gender over the two
periods under consideration.
In the two periods family equivalised income increases by 38% from 1995
to 2006 (from 11243 to 15547) while per capita income increases by 57%
(from 6186 to 9697). Moreover, the personal income from work and pension
for men is almost 50% more than women (12338 versus 8483 in the 1995, for
example) and finally males’ personal income increases more than women’s
personal income over time. Looking at the personal contribution we notice
that on average men are givers while women receivers within the family.
The income differences reduce after the implementation of ‘flexibility‘ rules
as both the contribution of men and the burden of the women decrease.
4The per-capita income from labour and pension is calculated as the sum of personal
income from labour and pension of all the members of the household divided by the
number of the household members.
5The total equivalized net household income is calculated as the sum of personal income
from labour and pension of all the members of the household and other sources of income
at household level (imputed rent, income from rental, interest, dividend and other capital
income, family/children allowances, other social exclusion, housing allowances and regular
inter-household cash transfer received) divided by the OECD equivalence scale.
7Table 2: Distribution of incomes over the two periods
ECHP IT-Silc
1995 1996 2004 2005
Equivalised income 11243 11015 15443 15547
Per-capita income 6186 6184 9574 9697
Personal income
Men 12338 12376 15805 15997
Women 8483 8574 10644 10820
Men with permanent contract 14986 15132 19210 19349
Women with permanent contract 11715 11937 14400 14610
Men with not permanent contract 8042 9806 12864 12881
Women with not permanent contract 6792 7184 10895 9665
Personal contribution
Men 19.71 19.62 15.77 16.92
Women -23.81 -23.21 -19.87 -20.55
Note: Incomes are reported in real value: base-year 2000.
82.1 Explanatory variables
Both ECHP and IT-Silc contain information on household and individuals:
demographic characteristics, personal income, housing conditions, employ-
ment. Regarding the last information we know whether he/she is working,
the type of contract, and the contract duration is grew, i.e. permanent ver-
sus fixed term contracts. Clearly due to the existing differences between
the two data sources; all the variables used have been made homogeneous
between ECHP and IT-Silc6.
Two groups of coovariates have been considered: let Pi be the first set of
explanatory variables describing individual characteristics. Pi includes age,
age squared, education dummies, area of residence, working status, and the
type of contract. Let Fi be the second set of coovariates describing family
composition. Fi will include number of females, number of members with
permanent and fixed term contract, number of unemployed, and number
of members out of labour forces. It is remarkable to underline that each
aforementioned variable is constructed without counting the respondent.
The analysis focuses on the type of contract related variable. This clas-
sifies individuals according to the following categories: (1)individuals who
have a permanent employment contract; (2)individuals with fixed term or
short-term contract, or specific training/apprenticeship contracts7; (3)indi-
viduals with other type of contract, such as people classified as family worker
or some other work arrangement and also those people who did not indicate
any status in employment but have a salary; (4)individuals who self-defined
themselves as unemployed; (5)the retired and finally (6)the other inactive
that are mainly students and housewives8.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for different types of contract/ eco-
nomic status for both men and women divided in employee (upper panel)
and not-employee (bottom panel). We notice an increase in the percent-
age of both the part time and the non-permanent workers. This concerns
mainly women: the percentage of women with temporary contracts varies
from 10% to 16% across the two periods. At the same time in the two
periods considered, unemployed and other workers decrease.
Table 4 shows the distribution of personal income by type of contract/
economic status during the two periods for both men and women. Incomes
increase especially for those who are out of the labour market, named other
workers or unemployed who probably have had occasional work experience
during the year. The same increase can be noticed also for temporary work-
ers, both for men and women. Over time we do not notice changing in gender
differences once we look at permanent workers. However because men’s in-
comes are always higher than women’s and such difference is around 20%
6Details are not reported for the sake of brevity but they are available upon request.
7For categories (1) and (2) we also make a distinction between full time and part time.
8Self employed were excluded because they are not regulated by any specific contract.
9Table 3: Distribution of individual by economic status/type of contract and
gender across the two periods (percentages)
ECHP IT-Silc
1995 1996 2004 2005
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Workers
Permanent 81,1 87,7 81,8 85,7 80,1 86,2 80,2 86,8
Full time 91,6 99,3 85,2 98,1 77,2 97,3 79,0 97,5
Part time 8,4 0,7 14,8 1,9 22,8 2,7 21,0 2,5
Not permanent 9,9 7,9 10,1 8,2 15,8 11,8 15,6 10,5
Full time 85,6 92,2 78,6 90,7 70,8 88,8 68,4 88,1
Part time 14,4 7,8 21,4 9,3 29,2 11,2 31,6 11,9
Other worker 9,0 4,5 8,0 6,1 4,1 2,0 4,2 2,7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Non-workers
Unemployed 8,5 13,7 8,5 13,7 5,6 7,5 5,9 7,5
Retired 19,0 36,0 18,8 36,0 24,6 45,7 24,4 45,1
Other Inactive 72,5 50,3 72,7 50,3 69,8 46,8 69,7 47,4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
for full time and 50% for part time. This result confirm the hypothesis that
women work more than men with atypical or non-standard contracts and
also they have lower salary than men in the same position (Villa, 2004).
Table 5 shows the personal contribution by type of contract, economic
status, and gender during the two periods. Men contribute always more than
women. Positive contributions decrease over time both for men and women
as well as for each type of contract. Such result together with an increase in
personal income highlight a reduction in the income differences within the
family. Regarding negative contributions associated to individuals who are
a burden for the family, it is noticeable a reduction in the absolute value
since the entity of the transfer appears to be less negative over time.
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Table 4: Distribution of personal incomes from labour and pension by type
of contract/economic status and gender, across the two periods
ECHP IT-Silc
1995 1996 2004 2005
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Permanent FT 12077 15017 12373 15144 15722 19345 15922 19473
Permanent PT 7536 11217 9370 14430 9934 14235 9674 14535
Not permanent FT 7233 7902 7554 10135 12000 13431 10767 13419
Not permanent PT 4725 7692 5925 6035 8215 8354 7254 8891
Other worker 3645 6621 3788 7640 9458 10726 10347 18187
Unemployed 1247 1410 960 1732 2555 3419 2918 4483
Retired 6824 9588 6749 9390 8963 13601 9397 13690
Other Inactive 856 366 947 493 2165 1796 2250 1794
Note: Incomes are reported in real value: base-year 2000.
Table 5: Distribution of personal contribution by type of contract/economic
status and gender during the two periods
ECHP IT-Silc
1995 1996 2004 2005
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Permanent FT 31,38 78,99 34,18 77,85 21,58 58,03 21,30 59,16
Permanent PT 7,55 41,51 17,35 70,57 7,61 23,83 4,88 23,11
Not permanent FT 8,18 35,31 14,83 53,78 13,42 35,13 6,52 36,48
Not permanent PT -4,04 45,81 1,98 15,82 1,28 38,75 -3,21 26,63
Other worker -22,81 16,49 -13,58 27,31 7,54 8,60 -1,18 40,71
Unemployed -42,87 -34,63 -47,17 -30,53 -35,91 -22,60 -33,40 -14,79
Retired 0,19 37,71 0,53 37,19 -7,58 25,92 -7,30 26,99
Other Inactive -46,82 -50,10 -46,65 -48,66 -42,79 -42,67 -42,87 -42,59
Note: Values are the percentages of money contribution each individual gives/receives to
level income differences.
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3 Methods
As already stated, the Italian questionnaire of two datasets (ECHP and
IT-Silc) have been used in this analysis. They are both longitudinal, so
panel data technique is used to estimate which factors affect the money
contribution within the family.
In particular two different equations for both men and women9 and for
both ECHP and IT-Silc are estimated. Let yit be the money contribution
for any man (woman) i (∀i = 1, ..., N). The model can be written:
yit = α0 + Pitβ1 + Fitγ1 + ui + it (1)
where
E(ui|Pi, F i) = 0
and
E(ui
2|Pi, F i) = σu2
The composite error can be written as:
vit = ui + it (2)
3.1 Implications of the estimation’s procedure
Panel data method gives the opportunity to look at time-invariant individual
effect. On the one hand the fixed effect model allows the individual effect
to be correlated with the regressors, removing the bias that would result. It
uses the within variation but it needs sufficient variation over time and can
only estimate coefficients on time-varying coovariates. On the other hand,
the between regression uses only the between-group variation amplifying the
individual effect and estimating with the potential bias due to the correlation
between the individual effect with the regressors. A more general panel data
technique is the random effect model where the use of the generalised least
squares method weight the between and the within variation providing the
efficient combination of the two. Of course, the choice of random effect model
in the context of panel data technique is based on whether the assumption of
individual effect uncorrelated with the regressors holds (Wooldridge, 2002).
A random effect model is chosen to estimate time-invariant coovariates. In
fact, there are only two years for each panel and some of the variables
included in the estimates, namely area of residence and education, do not
vary between them.
9A maximum likelihood ratio test has been performed to test whether the un-restricted
model (i.e. two separate model for men and women), has to be preferred to the restricted
one (i.e. one pooled equation for men and women). The test reject the assumption of no
differences between males and females, so two separate equations were estimated
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4 Estimates
Table 6 contains the random effect panel regressions of both samples used
in our analysis, performed for men and women, separately.
Considering the age and its squared term, it is clear that the contribution
changes both across gender and over the span considered, in order to keep
personal income level with the per-capita one. Men behave in an inverted
U-shaped in age as they reach the maximum at 55.5 years in the ECHP
sample and 37 years in the IT-Silc, respectively. This suggests that men are
more likely to support other family members since the beginning of their
occupational career; in particular as time passes by they reduce the entity
of such money transfer. However, it is remarkable to note that, this process
varies over time. Mainly, before the reduction of the levels of employment
protection through diverse reforms, males decrease the amount of money
transferred to other family members once are close to retirement. On the
contrary in the IT-Silc sample, where the maximum of this age function is
reached earlier than what emerged in the ECHP sample, men diminish the
entity of transfer versus any family member probably at the age when they
have more stable jobs. Regarding this variable instead, women follow an
U-shaped pattern in age with a minimum in adulthood (31 in ECHP and
34.5 in IT-Silc, respectively). According to empirical evidence on female
labour market participation (Del Boca, 2002; Di Tella and Mac Culloch,
2002; Jaumotte, 2003), women are more likely to experience occupational
interruptions when they are close to this age, especially because of preg-
nancy. In addition, women may also face lower employment rates before 30s
because of being still in education; as a result they are less economically
supportive within the family. As expected, differences between males and
females emerge. The latter are more likely to be receivers within the family.
With respect to regional area of residence, the results reflect the poor-
est economic conditions which characterise Italy. Regardless of gender and
span, what it emerges is that people living in the South are more willing to
share their incomes with all the other family members, possibly to overcome
occupational problems of some members.
Educational qualification estimates suggest that, less educated men, on
average, make a larger contribution to promote the reduction of intra-
household income differences. On examining males’ sample coefficients asso-
ciated to education in IT-Silc, the situation is different as highest educated
individuals appear to be more supportive within the family. Not surpris-
ingly instead, females sub-sample shows, in both data, especially those with
a levels of education over compulsory schooling, namely high school diploma
or a degree, positively contribute to narrow family income differences. Ac-
cording to the ISTAT statistics (ISTAT, 2009) labour market participation
is greater for more educated women (i.e. 58.5% and 72% for the case of
upper secondary school and tertiary education respectively), thereby having
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a job may help to reduce such household inequality.
Each member has a particular role in the family. In both surveys fathers
make larger transfers to other members living in the household, even if the
entity is smaller in the last period. Instead sons, as expected, play the role
of money receivers with regard to other family members, and the magnitude
of the coefficient is larger when labour market flexibility has been already
implemented. Even mothers are on average economically supportive in spite
of a smaller entity over the period considered.
Results related to the economic status of each family member show that
the pattern is equally distributed within the two sub-samples and across
span. Generally, people who have a permanent contract are significantly
more likely to promote an equal share of resources within the family. Evi-
dently, intrinsic characteristics associated with this type of contract explain
why this variable is a good predictor of the propensity to transfer money
within the family, namely job tenure, higher wages, better welfare provision,
etc. The category of workers, in a less favourable financial condition is part
time temporary contract holders apart from those who have other atypical
contract forms. Those who are out of the labour market for several reasons,
i.e. retirement, unemployment and inactivity, regardless of gender and data
considered, contribute negatively to level income differences. However, the
retired do not place a large financial burden on other family members as
unemployed, students and housewives do since they receive the pension.
Considering explanatory variables related to the household composition
of each respondent, excluding himself, the patterns by gender are quite sim-
ilar, but the coefficients differ in magnitude. A unit change in the number of
women living in a specific household enhances on average the entity of the
contribution, mainly for the case of males. Nevertheless, the amount reduces
in size over time. The same path is noticed, both for males and females, for
inactive and unemployed, even if in the IT-Silc males make large contribu-
tion to avoid household income differences when the number of members out
of the labour force in his/her family increases. On the contrary, after lower-
ing labour market protections, potentially, those who benefited more than
others of such interventions were females. They now become a small finan-
cial burden on men thanks to the availability of more flexible jobs. Finally,
the greater is the number of individuals with a job in a family, regardless
of the type of contracts, the smaller is the magnitude of the contribution
each individual has eventually to share with all the other family members,
especially for the case of men.
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Table 6: Estimates of random effect model for personal contribution within
the family
ECHP 1995-1996 IT-Silc 2005-2006
Men Women Men Women
Age 1.11*** -0.62*** 1.47*** -0.69***
Age squared -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.01***
Area of residence [
North -2.18* -0.06 -1.05 -0.51
South 4.10*** 2.81*** 1.99*** 1.31**
Education \
Tertiary education -2.08 11.05*** 2.40** 8.91***
Upper secondary education -2.81*** 6.44*** 0.04 5.36***
Member within the family §
Parents 38.50*** 14.59*** 20.33*** 12.59***
Children -29.22*** -0.54 -34.09*** -0.70
Type of contract ]
Permanent part time -10.48** -12.89*** -13.70*** -14.74***
Not permanent full time -13.33*** -19.49*** -9.68*** -11.90***
Not permanent part time -26.43*** -30.70*** -11.03*** -22.07***
Other workers -33.07*** -46.50*** -10.67*** -21.08***
Retired -29.61*** -37.86*** -23.30*** -42.44***
Unemployed -69.91*** -67.67*** -51.77*** -49.95***
Other inactive -63.01*** -71.76*** -45.34*** -61.94***
Family characteristics
Number women 9.71*** 5.40*** 3.92*** 5.15***
Number permanent contract -10.76*** -5.08*** -4.86*** -6.28***
Number not permanent contract -17.46*** -9.60*** -9.92*** -9.28***
Number unemployed 6.16*** 4.38*** 12.94*** 4.43***
Number out of labor force 7.65*** -1.15*** 15.55*** 2.07***
Constant 21.36*** 22.81*** -2.97 13.12***
σu 34.29*** 26.00*** 30.67*** 25.29***
σe 27.39*** 23.11*** 19.50*** 18.05***
Number of observations 15706 17930 25508 29565
Log likelihood -80068 -87583 -125297 -141125
Note: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, Reference categories: [ Center; \
Compulsory education; ] Permanent full time; § Other members
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4.1 Further investigations
Tables 7 and 8 show predicted values computed from the estimates. Four
patterns are considered: full time and part time permanent workers and full
time along with part time temporary workers. We also provide the predicted
values of non-workers: unemployed, inactive and retired. Each value is
computed under the assumptions that the individual’s contribution changes
with age, and distinguishing between parents (table 7) and children (table
8). Other coovariates are hold constant as follows: parents/children living
in the North, with an upper secondary school diploma and with number of
women, unemployed, person with permanent and temporary contracts equal
to the each sample mean.
Considering firstly the predicted values for parents, regardless of any
personal characteristics considered, it is remarkable to note that mother
always report lower rates of contribution compared with their counterpart
and the gap becomes larger once we look at temporary contracts, both
part-time and full-time. This results is in line with the income dynamics
observed by gender (see table 4). After the reforms, for example, a 30 year
old father with a part time permanent contract, contributes up to 51.5%
to level household income differences against 9.08% of mothers in the same
situation. The difference is even bigger if we consider 30 year old workers
with part time temporary contracts (53.73% for men and 1.75% for women).
However, within each age group, on average these differences by gender are
definitely narrowed than what found before the introduction of flexibility.
In fact these variations in contribution reduce as regards the difference be-
tween men and women in absolute value (i.e 59.36 minus 4,07 vs 53,73 minus
1,75, respectively before and after the reform, still for 30 year old). How-
ever, considering this age group, the entity of such contribution increases
if we take into account the relative terms, namely the ratio between men
and women (i.e. 59.36/4,07 vs 53,73/1,75, respectively before and after the
reform). The latter result underlines that mothers overall transfer less part
of their income to other family members than were able to do before the
reform. Finally, 60 year old mothers with temporary contracts, both part
time and full time, are the only ones to increase their own contribution in
the family (from 14% to 16% and from 25% to 26%, respectively). A plausi-
ble explanation is associated to the number of interventions implemented in
the labour market in terms of flexibility after 1996, which favour the partic-
ipation of women in the job market along with the opportunity of working
even if already retired (L.289/2002). In general, we can observe, both be-
fore and after the introduction of flexible types of contracts, that especially
aging women increase their contributions. This is the category which has
probably received the most benefits of all these reforms, especially because
mature women do not experience job interruption, for example because of
maternity.
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Once we look at the non-working parents, we notice that unemployed
mothers are less burdensome over the time. In fact, after the reforms, the
burden of an unemployed 40 year old mother reduces from -32% to -24%,
even more when is 50 year old, namely from -28% to -19%. On the contrary,
retired women after the reforms become a burden for all the other family
members, as they predicted values are now negative.
Finally, predicted values are also provided for children. It is interesting
to note that only permanent workers, whether son or daughter, positively
contribute to other family members. The children with temporary contracts
working part time increase their burden after the reforms. The amount
of money transferred increases as age passes by. In addition, the entity
of such contribution is large after the reform. Daughters (regardless of age)
transfer overall more than sons, if they are permanent and full time workers.
Instead, as expected, those who absorb more resources from the other family
members are unemployed and inactive children. This is even more noticeable
after the reform.
To sum up, over the span considered, the reduction in the contribution,
as shown in the predicted values for working parents; is essentially due to
a rise in the entity of the family income, which increases more than the
personal income. In fact from 1995 to 2005 the real per capita income
increases on average of 57% , instead the real personal income increased by
29% for permanent men and about 25% for women (Table 2)10.
10We remind that the dependent variable is defined as the difference between personal
income from labour and pension and the relative per-capita income divided by the total
equivalised net household income. As a result a reduction in the contribution can be
due to several factors, namely a reduction in the personal income, an increase in family
income which increases both equivalised and per-capita income, and a reduction in family
members.
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Table 8: Predicted values from random effect model: children
ECHP 1995-1996 IT-Silc 2004-2005
Age Age
20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50
Men
Permanent full time 3,12 10,34 14,54 15,73 13,91 18,07 19,45 18,05
Permanent part time -10,58 -3,37 0,84 2,03 3,43 7,60 8,97 7,57
Not permanent full time -6,56 0,66 4,86 6,05 0,58 4,74 6,12 4,71
Not permanent part time -7,91 -0,69 3,51 4,70 -12,52 -8,36 -6,98 -8,38
Unemployed -48,65 -41,43 -37,23 -36,04 -56,00 -51,84 -50,46 -51,86
Other Inactive -42,21 -35,00 -30,80 -29,61 -49,10 -44,94 -43,56 -44,96
.
Women
Permanent full time 10,97 10,53 12,68 17,42 20,59 19,65 20,82 24,11
Permanent part time -3,77 -4,21 -2,06 2,69 7,70 6,76 7,93 11,22
Not permanent full time -0,94 -1,38 0,77 5,52 1,10 0,16 1,33 4,62
Not permanent part time -11,10 -11,54 -9,39 -4,64 -10,11 -11,06 -9,88 -6,59
Unemployed -38,98 -39,42 -37,27 -32,53 -47,07 -48,02 -46,85 -43,56
Other Inactive -50,97 -51,41 -49,26 -44,52 -51,17 -52,12 -50,94 -47,65
Note: Predicted values for children living in the North with secondary level of education
and with all the other coovariates set at the sample mean.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has been motivated by the introduction of a number of reforms
implemented in Italy to reduce the levels of employment protection in favour
of permanent workers. This have been called into question the great benefits
this category derives regarding the non-permanent one. Up to the very
recent years, very little was known about the impact of the so-called atypical
or non-standard forms of employment on household income differences. Our
attempt was hence to fill in the gap providing evidence on the determinants
of the potential changes to personal levels of income with regard to other
family members before and after the introduction of employment flexibility
rules. We thus calculated the money contribution of each individual within
the family and used two longitudinal data (namely the Italian questionnaire
of ECHP and IT-Silc) so to be able to compare results across years before
(ECHP 1995-1996) and after (IT-Silc 2004-2005) the reforms. Panel data
techniques were performed for men and women, separately.
Our results showed that men are overall more supporting other family
members since the beginning of their occupational careers and mainly after
the reforms. The amount of money transferred to other family members
decreases as the age passes by. The opposite is true for women, with a
minimum in adulthood (31 in ECHP and 34.5 in IT-Silc, respectively) con-
firming that they are more likely to experience occupational interruptions
when they are close to this age, especially because of pregnancy. Moreover,
women contribute more than men when they have high levels of education.
Looking at the type of contract variable, we then saw that the contri-
bution of full time permanent workers reduces after the reforms signaling a
reduction of the income disparities within the family.
We also provided predicted values computed from the estimates analysing
both the type of contracts for workers and the non-workers and assuming
that the individual’s contribution changes with age. We also distinguish
between men and women and parents and children.
We noticed that mother always report lower rates of contribution com-
pared with their counterpart and the gap becomes especially large once we
look at temporary contracts, both part-time and full-time. The differences
between men and women reduce as age passes by. 60 year old mothers with
temporary contracts, both part time and full time, are the only ones to in-
crease their own contribution in the family (from 14% to 16% and from 25%
to 26%, respectively). We believed this result may be understood through
the number of interventions in terms of flexibility implemented after 1996,
which favour both the participation of women in the job market and the
opportunity of working even if already retired.
Regarding the children we showed that daughters with full time perma-
nent contracts contribute more than sons in the same position and this is
even stronger after the reforms. On the contrary, offspring with part time
20
temporary contracts increase their burden after the reforms.
To sum up we may drawn some conclusions: firstly the reduction in the
contribution is essentially due to a rise in the entity of the family income,
which increases more than the personal income. Secondly the flexibiliza-
tion, mainly devoted to the categories of individuals usually discriminated
in the labour market (i.e. women and/or young people), has increased the
job opportunity of women older than 40 years old, and for young people
has enhanced the benefits of those with secure employment. Finally, the
reduction of employment protection rules did not decrease the differences in
the labour forces participation between men and women and did not enrich
the contribution within the family of those individual working part time or
with non permanent contracts.
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Appendix A: Institutional labour market background
In the last ten years the development of the Italian Labor Law System
allows companies to introduce both new types of temporary jobs and to
loosen the ties of employment contracts already in use. The two principal
landmarks have been the Treu and Biagi reforms of 1997 and 2003, respec-
tively. The motivation of the ”Treu package”, was to increase employment,
particularly among the young with special provision for the economically
depressed South. This Law (n. 196 of June 1997) constitutes a sort of
watershed representing the beginning of the development of temporary con-
tracts. It eased regulation of the new apprenticeships and work-training
contracts, and created incentives for on-the job training temporary work via
private agencies and intra-regional labour mobility. Apprenticeships con-
tracts are extended to all sectors, including agriculture, the age increased
from 15 - 20 to people aged 16-24 (26 in the case of Southern Italy) and the
age increase of two years for disabled and artisans. It also legalised worker-
dispatching services and the temporary work agencies and liberalised fixed
term contracts (OECD, 2009). Besides, article 13 of the Treu package in-
troduced a set of provisions granting incentives for reduced working hours,
by means of relief on social security contributions. However, these measures
to encourage working hours reduction have to be implemented yet - owing
to factors such as the continuing discussion surrounding the draft bill to
introduce the 35-hour working week-.
The second labour-market reform in Italy was in 2003 when an addi-
tional and wider law have been implemented, namely the Biagi Law (L.
n. 30/2003). Such law aimed at taking some of the Treu reforms further,
in order to increase employment among youth, women, older workers and
job-seekers, particularly in the poorest Southern regions. The new measures
allow private employment agencies to compete in the full range of services
with public ones. The purpose is to create a plausibly set of instruments to
ensure the transparency and efficiency of the labour market, and to improve
work entry possibilities by the unemployed and by first-job seekers, with par-
ticular reference to the weak segments of the labour force. Another measure
is the creation of a ‘national continuous labour exchange’ (Borsa Continua
Nazionale del Lavoro). This consists of an on-line information system that
facilitates the matching between labour supply and demand, and enables
the monitoring of active employment policies, equal opportunity measures
and labour market integration of disadvantaged workers. A second aspect
of the Biagi reform bill focuses on the definition of new types of employment
contract, and the modification of existing ones, with a view to enhancing the
quality and stability of work by making the employment relationship more
adaptable to the needs of firms and workers. Moreover, wide margin is left
for collective bargaining to define the conditions of, and possible restrictions
on, the use of the new types of employment contract. The main innovations
are the following: the introduction of fixed term or open-ended staff leasing
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contracts . Under this system, companies may ‘lease’ the workers they need
for technical, productive or organisational reasons from employment agen-
cies. Secondly the so-called on-call job, whereby the worker is available by
the employer during a fixed period of time. The reform bill, also, confirms
and specifies regulations on job sharing, an arrangement based on a special
contract whereby two or more workers jointly assume the responsibilities of
a single work obligation (L. 30/2003 - article 41). This is intended to encour-
age firms to use part time work, and to facilitate the labour market entry
of people who need to reconcile work with family responsibilities, study or
other commitments. The bill seeks to foster the use of part time work -
both ‘vertical’ (i.e. comprised of working days similar to those of full time
workers, but less working day in a week), or ‘horizontal’ (with reduced hours
every day) - by including elastic clauses which allow employers (according to
criteria and at the conditions agreed by the parties) to increase working time
and modify schedules. An especially significant part of the reform bill con-
cerns the rules on contracts for employer-coordinated freelance work (the so
called co.co.co) - ‘semi-subordinate’ contracts which, according to the most
recent surveys, currently affect around 2.3 million Italian workers. A free-
lancer should be classified as self-employed, although a person who has been
regularly retained by a single employer for some time may also be regarded
as an employee. The reform bill also introduces a supplementary work cat-
egory - that is, work of a merely occasional nature undertaken by people at
risk of social exclusion or who have not yet entered the labour market or who
are about to leave it. By ‘merely occasional’ is meant activities involving a
worker for no more than 30 days per calendar year, and for which in any
case the remuneration amounts to no more than EUR 5,000 in a calendar
year. The service performed must take the form of minor and exceptional
domestic work (for instance, child and elderly care). Finally, another set of
employment relations addressed by the reform bill is about training, such as
apprenticeships. It will be possible to conclude an apprenticeship contract
with a young person aged between 18 and 29 for various purposes, these
being: (a) fulfilling the right/duty to education and training; (b) gaining
a qualification by means of on-the-job training and technical-professional
instruction; and (c) acquiring a diploma or complementing a higher edu-
cation programme. Furthermore, for particular categories, such as young
people aged 18 to 29 and disadvantaged workers (long-term unemployed
people aged under 32, unemployed workers aged over 45, women resident
in areas with high levels of female unemployment, etc.) the law introduces
a work entry contract, in order to conform the worker’s professional skills
in a particular job and to support his/her labour market entry or re-entry,
through an individual project (L. 30/2003 - article 55). This employment
relationship will replace the existing work/training contract, which has been
criticised by the EU for their overly wide scope of application.
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics: Men IT-Silc
Variable N. of obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Contribution 25508 16.44 62.91 -626.47 654.15
Age 25508 41.17 23.03 0.00 8.00
North 25508 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
South 25508 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 25508 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Upper secondary education 25508 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Up to lower secondary education 25508 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Parent 25508 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Children 25508 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Permanent full time 25508 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Permanent part time 25508 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Not permanent full time 25508 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Not permanent part time 25508 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
Other workers 25508 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
Retired 25508 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Unemployed 25508 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
Other inactive 25508 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Number women 25508 1.28 1.28 0.00 8.00
Number permanent contract 25508 0.10 0.31 0.00 3.00
Number not permanent contract 25508 0.54 0.70 0.00 4.00
Number unemployed 25508 0.10 0.34 0.00 4.00
Number out of labor force 25508 1.27 0.99 0.00 10.00
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics: Women IT-Silc
Variable N. of obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Contribution 29565 -20.27 18.27 -753.07 500.00
Age 29565 44.00 22.77 0.00 80.00
North 29565 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
South 29565 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 29565 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Upper secondary education 29565 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Up to lower secondary education 29565 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Parent 29565 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Children 29565 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Permanent full time 29565 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Permanent part time 29565 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Not permanent full time 29565 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Not permanent part time 29565 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Other workers 29565 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Retired 29565 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Unemployed 29565 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Other inactive 29565 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number women 29565 0.75 0.85 0.00 7.00
Number permanent contract 29565 0.08 0.29 0.00 3.00
Number not permanent contract 29565 0.56 0.70 0.00 4.00
Number unemployed 29565 0.09 0.32 0.00 4.00
Number out of labor force 29565 1.11 0.95 0.00 9.00
27
Table 11: Descriptive statistics: Men ECHP
Variable N. of obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Contribution 15706 19.65 76.92 -75.00 448.40
Age 15706 36.94 22.13 0.00 87.00
North 15706 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
South 15706 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 15706 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Upper secondary education 15706 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Up to lower secondary education 15706 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.00
Parent 15706 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Children 15706 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Permanent full time 15706 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Permanent part time 15706 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Not permanent full time 15706 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Not permanent part time 15706 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
Other workers 15706 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Retired 15706 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Unemployed 15706 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Other inactive 15706 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Number women 15706 1.50 0.87 0.00 7.00
Number permanent contract 15706 0.07 0.29 0.00 3.00
Number not permanent contract 15706 0.57 0.70 0.00 4.00
Number unemployed 15706 0.20 0.53 0.00 6.00
Number out of labor force 15706 1.19 0.89 0.00 6.00
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics: Women ECHP
Variable N. of obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Contribution 17930 -23.54 0.44 -75.00 328.18
Age 17930 15.45 0,9375 0.00 87.00
North 17930 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
South 17930 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 17930 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Upper secondary education 17930 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Up to lower secondary education 17930 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Parent 17930 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Children 17930 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Permanent full time 17930 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Permanent part time 17930 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Not permanent full time 17930 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Not permanent part time 17930 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Other workers 17930 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Retired 17930 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Unemployed 17930 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Other inactive 17930 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number women 17930 0.97 0.92 0.00 6.00
Number permanent contract 17930 0.07 0.28 0.00 3.00
Number not permanent contract 17930 0.62 0.70 0.00 4.00
Number unemployed 17930 0.21 0.54 0.00 7.00
Number out of labor force 17930 0.96 0.87 0.00 6.00
